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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The legislature by this act has provided parties with a method of
settling their present or future controversies by arbitration under their
own written agreements. With thoughtful and clear drafting, and a
sincere intention by all parties to avoid litigation and to solve their
controversies amicably, this act can be expected to greatly reduce
litigation in civil controversies; to facilitate settlement of disputes
involving only nominal amounts; and to obviate much of the delay,
worry, expense and hard feelings which so often accompany litigation.42
"In Washington, the services of the American Arbitration Association are
available to parties desiring to arbitrate. It is a non-partisan, non-political, non-
profit-making organization, which will furnish upon request and for a nominal
sum a panel of arbitrators composed of local professional and business men who
volunteer their services. It has also established a set of rules governing the
mechanics of arbitration which parties may include in their written contracts.
INJURY BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS AND THE EFFECT OF




A troublesome problem in the field of accident insurance is the
interpretation of the phrase "by accidental means" and the effect of
pre-existing disease upon a case involving this interpretation. The
decisions vary, not only from state to state but often within the same
jurisdiction. This confused state' of case law results from the in-
numerable variety of fact patterns considered; and is due, in part,
to the well-recognized sympathy of jurors toward widows and orphans
who comprise the largest class of beneficiaries. The cases exemplify
two main views, each supported by considerable authority I Excluding
the factor of disease, the principal rules deducible from the cases are:
(i) The apparent majority view,2 that if the injury or death is the
result of the voluntary act of the insured, done in the manner intended
and unaccompanied by any unforeseen accidental cause, the injury
or death is not by accidental means; ' and
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 868, § 257.
- 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) 868, § 1145.
3Id. at 4022.
'VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 871.
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(2) the minority rule, that where injury or death is unforeseen,
unexpected, and without design, and is not such as results naturally
from the voluntary and intentional act, but rather constitutes an un-
usual result, it may be said that it results from accidental means.'
The Washington position is now in line with the majority as the
result of the recent decision in Evans v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. et al.'
The decision in this case overruled holdings in two prior cases" by
which the Washington court had subscribed to the minority view. In
the Evans case, the widow of the insured, as beneficiary, brought suits
on three policies of accident insurance against three insurers. The
three policies were worded similarly' and the suits were consolidated
for trial. The policy with the Metropolitan Insurance Company pro-
vided for double indemnity in case death occurred, " as the result,
directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sus-
tained through external, violent and accidental means and death
shall not have been the result of self-destruction, whether sane or
insane, or caused by, or contributed to directly or indirectly, or wholly
or partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity "' The insured
collapsed and died after pushing his 1941 Buick sedan an approximate
total of fifty feet, part of'which was slightly upgrade over the crown of
an intersecting street. He was a man of sixty-one, in apparent good
health and of normal height and weight. He was accustomed to
performing the usual duties about his house, which consisted
chiefly of mowmg the lawn, and to walking up several flights of stairs
to Ins office. The autopsy revealed that the cause of death was "coro-
5See cases cited in 45 C. J. S., LsmuxcE (1946) 111, § 753.
6 126 Wash. Dec. 557, 174 P. (2d) 961 (1946)
1 Horsefall v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 Pac. 1028 (1903), Ben-
nett v. Muir Trust Life Ins. Co., 21 Wn. (2d) 698, 152 P (2d) 713 (1944)$Policy No. 2, INDusTR PoIacy ACCmiTAL DEATH BENEriT, " upon due
proof that the insured has sustained bodily injuries, solely through external
violent and accidental means, resulting directly and independently of all other
causes."
Policy No. 3, TRAvELEs'S I s. Co., " against loss resulting directly and
independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained during the
term of this policy and effected solely through accidental means. The insurance
shall not cover hernia, nor shall it cover accident m3ury, death, disability
or other loss caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, by bacterial
Infections except through an accidental cut or wound, or by any other
kind of disease."
' Evans v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., et al., 126 Wash. Dec. 557, 559, 174 P (2d) 961,
964 (1946), cited supra note 6. Note that a policy may cover death by accidental
means, death or injury by accidental means, or merely injury alone.
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nary thrombosis due to arteriosclerosis"; 11 that the left coronary vessels
which supply the heart itself were much thickened and the openings
"very, very small,"' 1 compared with the normal heart; and that this
was a condition of long standing. The medical witnesses testified that
such exertion by a person with a heart in such condition would probably
cause death and that the same exertion by a man with a normal heart
would not. 2 Trial before a jury in the lower court resulted in a decision
for the plaintiff, but this was reversed and dismissed, three judges
dissenting. This case presents a clear factual pattern for the application
of the majority rule; but it gives little hint as to how far the Washing-
ton court is willing to go in applying the rule to more indistinct factual
situations.
In order adequately to examine the problem, it is necessary that the
terms used in these policies be defined. "Accident," "accidental" and
"accidental means" are peculiarly uncertain of definition since their
meaning depends upon their application to the facts of each individual
case."8 The base word, "accident," connotes in popular usage a hap-
pening by chance, not according to the usual run of things, or not as
expected. 4 While, strictly speaking, an event may be accidental only
when dissociated from any human agency, such interpretation is not
recognized in the law of accidental insurance. 5 Such words, in absence
of express statute"8 or contract, are given their ordinary, popular
meaning." It is held that there should be no attempt to interpret them
20 Certificate of death by J. W Mattson, M.D.
"I Evans v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., et al., 126 Wash. Dec. 557, 562, 174 P (2d) 961,
965 (1946) Testimony at trial by Dr. Edwin W Janes, who reviewed the autopsy
at the request of the respondent.
12 Id. at 563.
Is VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 870.
14 United States Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 33 L. ed. 60 9
Sup. Ct. 755 (1889) See also BLAcK's LAW DicT. Evans v. Metro Life Ins. Co.,
et al., 126 Wash. Dec. 557, 583, 174 P (2d) 961 (1946), cited supra note 6. "The
conclusion we must reach from a consideration of the cited cases is that accident
is never present when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or
brings about the result of mury or death."
15 Grovernor v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 102 Neb. 629, 168 N. W 596 (1918)
16 Apparently the only statute of this kind is in Ontario. ON. REv. STAT.
(1914), c. 183, § 172, "Bodily muries are within an accident policy if they
happened without the direct intent of the insured, or as the result of an inten-
tional act, if such act did not amount to voluntary or negligent exposure to
unnecessary danger."
27 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Mosely, 211 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914)
"s Ripley v. Ry Passengers Assur. Co., 83 U. S. 336, 21 L. ed. 469 (1873), U. S.
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in any technical sense. 9 Any means coming from outside the body
of the insured which causes injury is within the definition of "ex-
ternal,"20 while the reqturement that the means be "violent" may be
fulfilled by any force, however slight.2 "Means," as used in the policy,
is synonymous with "causes,"22 thus "external, violent and accident l
means" apply to the cause of the injury and not to the injury itself.2"
If they are used in the disjunctive, t.e., "external, violent or accidental
means," either violent or external means would be sufficient.2" Such
terms were added by the insurer for the purpose of limiting the risk
defined by "accidental means," but their inclusion has had little if any
influence on its construction by most courts.
"Bodily injury" is construed as excluding disability caused by
disease.23 "Disease" is interpreted to mean a sickness or ailment of
a significant or settled character; it does not refer to a temporary or
passing disorder.28 It seems that the inclusion of disease as an excep-
tion to the contract coverage is an attempt to do away with the rule of
proximate cause, in order to exempt the insurer from liability in case
disease contributes in any way whatsoever to the death or injury
The courts have not favored this attempt, and hold uniformly that
the means must be the proximate rather than the sole cause of the
resultant injury or death, and that a total absence of latent contribut-
Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 33 L. ed. 60, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1889),
cited supra note 14.
10 Kane v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 3 Wn. (2d) 355, 100 P (2d)
1036 (1940).
20 45 C. J. S., IrsuxcE (1946) 784, § 755.
" Paul v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347 (1889)
22 Bjorklund v. Continental Cas. Co., 161 Wash. 340, 297 Pac. 155 (1931); Pope
v. Busmessmen's Assur. Co. of Amer., 235 Mo. App. 263, 131 S.W. (2d) 887 (1939)
2 Ibtd.
21 Okla. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 44 Okla. 783, 145 Pac. 1138, L. R. A. 1915E,
695 (1915). "The words 'or' and 'and' in a provision making the insurer liable
where the mury is effected exclusively by external, violent and (or) accidental
means, resulting in death, cannot be treated as interchangeable, so as to create
a liability only where death results from external and violent means which
are also accidental."
21 Jensma v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 64 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933),
cert. demed in Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Jensma, 289 U. S. 763, 77 L. ed.
1505, 53 Sup. Ct. 795 (1933); 1 APPLmvrw, sUncE LAW AxD PaACTxcE (1941) 473,
§ 393,
2, U. 9. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum, 270 Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921)
(Wash.); Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 94 Utah 570, 80 P (2d)
348 (1938)
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ing causes will not be required."7
In order thoroughly to examine the problem presented by fact
situations similar to the Evans case, it is necessary first to distinguish
and analyze separately the factors of:
(i) the type of means, accidental. or otherwise, which cause the death
or injury This embodies two further considerations:
(a) whether the element to be examined is the cause, or the
result itself; and
(b) whether the element is really accidental,
(2) the element of pre-existing disease.
It is then necessary to combine (z) and (2) in order to discover
the effect, if any, of each one upon the other.
II.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF MEANS, ACCIDENTAL OR OTHER, WHICH
CAUSE THE DEATH OR INJURY
(a) Of the preceding factors, (i-a) is entirely a question of law and
marks the point of divergence between the majority and minority
views. These views now merit further examination. The minority rule
tests the accidental character of a means by its effects and holds that
accidental means are those which produce effects that are not natural
and probable consequences.28 Thus, any unexpected result is deemed
to have been effected by accidental means. By the usual rationale,
there is no distinction in ordinary speech between accidental means
and accidental result, and thus the reviewing court will find none."
This approach not only does violence to the express terms of the
policy-contract,80 but is unsupportable when viewed in conjunction
with another rule applied by majority and minority courts alike: If
the result is such that it follows from ordinary means voluntarily
employed in a manner that is not unusual, it cannot be called a result
effected by accidental means, even though the result is unforeseen
and umntended."' This rule has been followed without question in
27 Evans v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., et al., 126 Wash. Dec. 557, 584, 174 P (2d) 961,
977 (1946) and cited cases.
28 6 CooLEY's BRErs ox I stU mcE (2d ed. 1905) 5234.
29 Denton v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Supp. 556 (D. C. Md. 1938)
30 See note 9 supra.
51 The rule was first laid down by Mr. Justice Blatchford in the leading
Supreme Court case on this matter. U. S. Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131
U. S. 100, 33 L. ed. 69, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1889), cited supra note 14.
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Washington. 2 "Ordinary means," as used by the courts, denotes the
type of acts which are usual, ordinary and customary in the life of the
insured, such as his work,8" or usual recreation.8" Note that the means,
and not the result, is being tested; this is the very antithesis of the
minority doctrine. Thus the minority courts are placed in the position
of testing the means in one instance and the result in another. Actually,
as a practical matter, it is to be doubted that death or injury could be
caused by the usual and customary acts of the insured, without the
addition of any unforeseen or unexpected event, or without the con-
currence of a disease sufficiently serious to bar recovery under the
applicable prohibitory provision of the policy
The minority position of testing the result rather than the means
might possibly be justified in theory Assuming an accidental (i.e.,
unforeseen, unintended and unusual8 ) result, and postulating no
contributing disease, then at least one of the concurring causes must
also have been accidental. In other words, the intentional acts or
elements must have combined with some element which was accidental
in order to bring about a result which was accidental. (If all causes
are intentional, it necessarily follows that the result must also be
intentional; thus if the result is accidental, then one cause at least
must also have been accidental.) Under this approach, the problem
would then resolve itself into the question of how much weight should
be given this accidental factor. The fact that the result was accidental
would then superficially justify a finding that this elusive accidental
factor was a sufficiently important concurring cause to be the proximate
cause of the injury or death. This would also justify sending the case
to the jury as a question of fact-which in itself explains what may
otherwise seem incongruous. Under this approach, if valid, the terms
of the policy would be fully complied with, as the death or injury
would have been effected by accidental means.
In the opimon of the writer, this syllogistic approach leads to the
82 See nfra notes 33 and 34.33 Crowell v. Sunset Cas. Co., 21 Wn. (2d) 238, 150 P (2d) 728 (1944) The
insured worked as a fireman in a steam plant. During a particularly hard day,
he collapsed and died as the result of coronary thrombosis. Judgment for the
beneficiary reversed upon appeal.
-1 Hodges v. Mut. Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n, 15 Wn. (2d) 699, 131
P.(2d) 937 (1942) The insured, a construction worker, suffered a heart attack
while engaging in his favorite recreation, dancing, and died. Judgment for the
beneficiary reversed on appeal.
38 See note 14 supra.
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doctrine of proximate causation which, if properly applied, would rule
it out."' In the usual case of this type, it is amply demonstrated that
known causes obtain the result. It is not often that courts discard such
causes in order to attribute a result to a cause which is unknown. This
approach apparently was not raised in any of the cases but it seems
inherent in the minority view 1,
The majority of courts distinguish between "accidental death" and
"accidental means which cause death." Their approach is first to sep-
arate the cause or causes from the result and then to ascertain if the
cause or causes were really accidental. Thus, while a result such as
death may be accidental because unforeseen, unexpected, et cetera,
the acts of the insured which cause the result may not fall within that
definition. (For the purposes of this comment, such acts or causes
shall be called "intentional.") This is illustrated by the so-called
"sunstroke cases,""8 in which the insured, a healthy, normal individual,
has exposed himself to the sun and suffered a fatal sunstroke. By the
modern view, the cause of death was the intentional exposure to the
sun and thus does not come within the coverage of a policy which
provides for payment when the death is the result of accidental means. 9
However, if while doing an intentional act, something unforeseen and
unexpected occurs which operates to bring about the injury or death,
the result will be deemed effected by accidental means and the policy
will cover it."0 This is analogous to the doctrine of intervening cause
in tort law " For example, if the insured were cranking his car and
36 50 C. J., PROXIVATE CAUSE (1930) 836 to 842; II TORTS RESTATEMENT (Official
Draft 1934) §1 431, 433.
37 See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1 at 879.
38 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 2; Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291
U. S. 491, 78 L. ed. 934, 54 Sup. Ct. 461, 90 A. L. R. 1382 (1933) The decisions
are collated in 17 A. L. R. 1197 (1922) with the comment that the slight weight
of authority is that sunstroke suffered unexpectedly is within the coverage of a
policy insuring against death by external, violent and accidental means. VANCE,
op. cit. supra note 1, in the footnotes at 876, states those cases hold that the
unknown factor is the weakened state of the bodily organism which suffers an
unexpected mury when exposed to unusual heat. The recent trend of the
decisions, backed by the authoritative Landress cases, seems to be contra, how-
ever. The Washington court cites the Landress case with favor in the Evans case
(at 566), and thus it would seem that in view of both the Crowell case, op. cit.
supra note 35, and the Evans decision, sunstroke in Washington would not be
covered as death by accidental means. This, as pointed out in the text, seems the
more logical view.
39 Ibid.
40 5 Coucn, op. cit. s pra note 2, at 4203.
4111 TORTS RESTATEMENT § 441; see also § 440, "Superseding Cause."
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died, the death would not be covered; but if, while he was cranking,
the brakes released or he slipped and fell and so died, the death would
be covered.42 This, m fact, would seem to be in agreement with the
popular conception of the accident policy Such a policy, it is to be
remembered, is not designed to indemnify for death, no matter how
caused, but only for death brought about by causes which are m them-
selves accidental.
(b) Whether the act or event to be examined is accidental or not
is a question of fact and presents one of the most difficult problems in
the field of accident insurance law The decision in each case will
necessarily be governed by the peculiar fact situation before the court;
and the number and variety of situations that may be presented are
bounded only by the limits of human experience. Since the Washing-
ton court has adopted the majority view, the remainder of this analysis
will be primarily directed toward that view However, much of what
will be said pertains to both doctrines.
An operating force or cause purely external to the control and intent
of the insured is clearly accidental; while a cause entirely within such
control and intent is clearly intentional---.e., not accidental. Thus the
extremes are located; "completely accidental" being the one extreme
and "completely intentional" the other. Each factual situation will
fall somewhere between. No line can be drawn between these two
extremes with any degree of exactness which would allow a factual
situation to be placed definitely either on one side of the line or the
other. Few events can be so particularly defined as not to contain ele-
ments of both the known and the unknown.
The writer suggests that the problem may best be approached by-
(z) segregating each contributing cause or factor; and (2) determining
which, if any, of the factors are accidental"--s.e., outside the control
and intent of the insured. The problem then becomes similar to a
determination of proximate cause. Counsel must determine not only
the emphasis to be given each factor; but also, the effect of the con-
currence of factors upon (i) each other, and (2) the particular
result." Of especial aid in the determination of emphasis will be prior
'
2 Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 213 Fed. 595 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914),
44 INs. L. J. 397.
"See note 14 supra.
"For example m the sunstroke cases, it would seem that the separated causes
of death would be:
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insurance cases within the jurisdiction. This rule of thumb should
also help; the further the primary or substantial cause of the result
is beyond the control and intent of the insured, the more likely the
court will be to construe such result to have been effected by accidental
means. In other words, the more chance that the insured has to prevent
the result, the less chance his beneficiary will have to collect.
III.
EFFECT OF PRE-EXISTING DISEASE
Although the factors of accidental means and pre-existing disease
or physical condition are here treated separately, m the usual case
both elements are present. It is thus important to distinguish and
examine them, and then to deterrmne the effect, if any, of their integra-
tion.
The usual accident policy provision in regard to disease reads much
like that involved in the Evans case; " and death shall not have
been caused or contributed to directly or indirectly, or wholly or
partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity" The Evans
court adopted the most logical approach in interpreting this clause by
deterrmning whether the physical condition or disease was a contribut-
ing cause or merely a condition upon which the misfortune operated.
Courts seem to disregard "wholly or partially," "directly or indirectly"
.and like phrases. They uniformily hold that recovery will be barred
only if the disease bears a causal connection to the result." A con-
trary holding would allow an unjustifiable delimitation upon the scope
of liability It would conceivably make it possible for any physical
disability, sufficiently serious to be called such, to bar recovery, no
matter how slight its effect upon the result." The courts have as yet
been unwilling so to hold.
(1) the voluntary exposure of the insured to the sun,
(2) the heat of the sun, and
(3) any inherent susceptibility of the insured to heat.
(1) would be clearly non-accidental; (2), in conjunction with (1), would seem
to be non-accidental also; (3) if actually unknown to the insured, and given
sufficient weight by the court, could conceivably be construed as transforming
the combination of the three into being accidental. However, logically, if that
much weight is given the third factor, then it must necessarily come within the
prohibitory disease provisions of the policy and recovery must be demed on
that ground.
15 6 CooLmy's BRars ON INsURA'cE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 5352.
,0 Such is the feared result in the dissent of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Landress
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 78 L. ed. 934, 54 Sup. Ct. 461, 90 A.
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The determination whether a disease is to be construed as a cause
or as a condition would seem to be based upon: (i) the seriousness of
the disease, and (2) the significance of its contribution to the death or
injury '7 If the disease is serious and plays a substantial role in effect-
mg the result, the court is more likely to construe it as a concurring
cause and so bar recovery However, tlns does not always follow
Both factors may be substantial and yet the court hold the disease to
be a condition, "even though necessary to the result."', Note that an
entirely different question is presented when the accident causes a
disease wlhch in turn causes the death; the policy covers this situation. "
Whether a disease or physical condition is of a sufficiently settled and
significant character to come within the policy meaning of disease"0
constitutes a preliminary question, which, upon affirmative determina-
tion, poses the crucial question. What relation does such disease. have
in producing the result? It is very possible, for example, that a very
serious heart ailment may have existed and yet have made no causal
contribution to death.
The analysis of this problem also may best be. presented by resolv-
mg it into a question of degree. The terms "efficient" and "non-efficient"
will be used to denote the extremes. A disease to be an "efficient"
factor must be sufficiently serious and must play such a substantial
role in obtaining the result that the courts will view'it as a concurring
cause. On the other hand, if the disease, 1 although coming within the
L. R. 1382 (1933), cited supra note 38. The same fear is voiced by Justice Con-
nelly in his dissent in the Evans case.
' It is simple to see how (1) could occur without the occurrence of (2), or
(1) and (2) together, but it seems inherently impossible that (2) could occur
alone.
"
8 Evans v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., et aL, 126 Wash. Dec. 557,. 578, 174 P (2d)
961, 974 (1946), cited supra note 6; Hill v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 186 Wash.
167, 57 P. (2d) 405 (1936); Pierce v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Calif., 7 Wn. (2d) 151,
165, 109 P.(2d) 322, 328 (1941), Kearney v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 184 Wash. 579,
52 P.(2d) 903 (1935)
"Hanley v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 164 Wash. 320, 2 .P (2d) 636 (1931);
Heinich v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 186 Wash. 652, 63 P (2d) 432 (1936), Kane v.
Order of Commercial Travelers, 3 Wn.(2d) 355, 100 P.(2d) 1036 (1940), cited
supra note 19.
50 Evans v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., et aL, 126- Wash. Dec. 557, 582, 174' P (2d)
961, 976 (1946), cited supra note 27.
51 Disease as herein used includes not only ailments produced by bacteria
(which is the normal definition), but also physical disabilities.
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policy meaning," is not sufficiently serious5" to play a substantial
causal role, and thus is held to be a mere condition, it must be termed
"non-efficient." For example, the mere exertion of a normally healthy
person in pulling a rowboat from the water will cause him no serious
injury However, if his heart is in such condition that the exertion
causes death, the heart ailment is not merely a necessary condition but
a contributing cause, and, as such, should bar recovery 1,
Apparently, knowledge by the insured of his poor physical condition
merits little consideration in this type of policy 1 When elicited, how-
ever, this fact may possibly have a slight adverse effect upon the jury--
especially if argued in connection with the definition of "accidental."
IV
CONCLUSION
Each case would thus seem to be a question of comparative analysis.
Actually, according to the most logical construction of the insurance
contract, two separate factors are presented. (i) whether the means
or causes were accidental, and (2) whether the disease or physical
condition was such as could be termed "efficient"--4.e., was it a cause
or a condition in relation to the result? An affirmative holding as to
either may be utilized by the insurer to deny recovery As a practical
matter, however, it will be necessary to determine the court's probable
reaction to a given case which includes elements of both factors. Each
of these factors bears significance not only in its status as a separate
and definite requirement, but also in its relative effect upon the other.
This latter effect may be stated: The more the cause tends to be
intentional, the less efficient need the disease be in order to bar recovery
In other words, the efficiency of the disease is directly proportional
to the fortuity of the means. The converse would also be true: The
more the operating force tends toward being accidental, the more
efficient the disease must be in order to deny liability This suggested
5- Otherwise the court need not concern itself with the effect of the disease.
It is only when the disease or disability is of a "sufficiently settled and significant
character" that the court must decide whether it is a cause or a condition.
5'From an extensive review of the cases, the writer concludes there is a
distinct difference in the degree of seriousness necessary to bring the disease
within the meanzng of the policy and the degree of seriousness necessary to a
finding that it was a concurring cause.
5" Herthel v. Time Ins. Co., 221 Wis. 208, 265 N. W 575 (1936)
5 See the exhaustive list of cases in VAr; AuxEN, RE"Y R1zPRwcE MIGEsT OF
AccnDETr INSURANCE LAw (1922)
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rule is not without limitation, however. If either of the factors is
manifestly outside the coverage of the policy, s.e., clearly non-accidental
or clearly efficient, a fortiors at least, no recovery should lie.
The factor of disease excluded, a death caused by purely accidental
means must be indemnified, while the contrary is true if the act or
means is clearly intentional. Also, if the death is the result of disease
alone, it cannot be included within the risk for which the insurer con-
tracted to be liable. In these situations there is no problem of inter-
relation. Where this occurs, there are four basic fact patterns which,
if noted, are very helpful in attempting to determine the probable out-
come of a, case. The innumerable gradations between must be tested
by the proportion rule above outlined.
(i) If the active operating force or cause is purely external to the
control and intent of the insured (and therefore accidental), and it
operates upon an efficient disease or physical condition, then in the
great majority of cases it is left to the jury to decide whether the
disease is a contributory cause that would bar recovery, or a condition
that would allow it. In view of the natural tendencies of juries in cases
of this kind, the disease is usually found to be a condition. The court
then terms such disease, "a condition necessary to the result."58 This
approach is borne out by the Washington decisions and explains the
difference between the Pierce and Evans cases.5 7
50 See note 48 supra.
U'Kearney v. Wash. Nat. Ins. Co., 184 Wash. 579, 52 P (2d) 903 (1935), cited
supra note 48. The facts showed that the insured had suffered from eye trouble
for a period of ten years or more and had only 20 per cent visition in one eye.
After a fall down a flight of stairs in which he struck his head, he became
blind. The expert testimony was in dispute as to whether the fall or the con-
dition of the eyes caused the blindness,'and the jury found it to be the fall.
Recovery was allowed, the injury being held the result of accidental means.
Hill v. Gr. Northern Life Ins. Co., 186 Wash. 167, 57 P.(2d) 405 (1936), cited
supra note 48. In the same type policy, it was held to be a question of fact
for the jury whether the death of the insured by cerebral hemorrhage was due
to an automobile collision or an existing coronary condition. Recovery allowed.
Pierce v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Calif., 7 Wn. (2d) 151, 109 P. (2d) 822
(1941), cited supra note 48. The insured suffered from arteriosclerosis and high
blood pressure and sustained severe fright when almost involved in an auto-
mobile collision. The shock resulted in a stroke and partial paralysis. As to the
cause of the stroke, there were two conflicting medical theories between which
the jury could choose. Recovery was allowed.
Graham v. Police & Firemen's Ins. Assn., 10 Wn. (2d) 288, 116 P. (2d) 352 (1941)
The insured died of coronary thrombosis following a fall down the basement
stairs as he rushed to the aid of his daughter whose clothes had caught on fire.
He had an existing heart condition which had manifested itself on more than
one occasion. The evidence was sufficiently conflicting to go to the jury, which
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(2) If the accidental force operates upon a non-efficient disease or
disability, i.e., a pure condition, recovery is uniformly allowed in both
the majority and minority jurisdictions. The disease or physical dis-
ability, being non-efficient, is a factor which merits little consideration
by counsel, although, of course, it is still an issue presented to the
jury as
(3) If the active operating force is intentional (i.e., non-accidental),
because within the control and intent of the insured, and if it operates
upon an efficient disease, it would seem clear that there can be no
recovery-and this upon two separate grounds; (a) the death was not
caused by accidental means, and (b) a disease was a substantial con-
tributing factor to the result. This is the present Washington rule."
(4) The same result should a prwrt follow if the intentional act
operates upon a non-efficient disability or disease, causing the injury
or death. Here as in (2), the issue of disease would not control, but
the intentional character of the act should deny recovery o
found that the disease was a mere "contributory factor" and that the proximate
cause of the death was the fall.
58 Hemrich v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 186 Wash. 652, 63 P (2d) 432 (1936), cited
supra note 49. The instruction to the jury was held proper when it in effect
stated that if the accident set in motion some latent physical defect, then the
insured died as the result of accidental means. The insured had broken his leg
while walking and died from thrombosis of a pulmonary artery, the thrombus
or blood-clot having originated in the region of the fracture. Recovery was
allowed.
Kane v. Order of United Comm. Travelers, 3 Wn. (2d) 355, 100 P (2d) 1036
(1940), cited supra note 49. The insured received injuries from an accidental
fall which aggravated an existing herma and necessitated a surgical operation.
While recuperating, he contracted lobar pneumonia from which he died. Re-
covery allowed.
50 Hodges v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 15 Wn. (2d) 699, 131 P (2d)
937 (1942), see note 34 supra. Crowell v. Sunset Cas. Co., 21 Wn. (2d) 238, 150
P (2d) 728 (1944), see note 32 supra. In the Evans case, the intentional over-
exertion of the insured, in connection with a pre-existing heart ailment,
caused death. This was held not to be by accidental means, and recovery was
denied. This case overruled the Ho'rsefall case, where the insured died from
dilation of the heart a few days after lifting a heavy iron bar from an awkward
position and recovery was allowed as death was caused by accidental means. The
more recent Bennett case was also overruled. There the insured, a powerful
man and a member of the Yakima fire department, died from a herniatic swell-
ing in the groin after lifting a heavy ladder during a demonstration before a
class of new men. He died during a subsequent operation but it was expressly
found that nothing during the operation caused his death. There, too, the court
held without a dissenting vote, that this was death by accidental means. The
case was remanded, however, because of an error in instructions.
11 There are no Washington cases on this point. But see VAx Aux=, op. cit.
supra note 55.
COMMENT
Under this analysis, the factor of disease seems effectively excluded.
However, the insurer may still attempt to convince the jury that the
disease or disability was so important to the resultant death or injury
that it must have been a concurring cause, and that recovery must be
denied."' The cases do not lack instances of such findings. 2
It must be emphasized that the above four situations are concerned
with clear cases where, from a perusal of the facts, it can reasonably
be said that the operating force is either intentional or accidental and
that the disease is either efficient or non-efficient in causing the result.
The myriad of degrees between accidental and intentional means and
between efficient and non-efficient diseases present the difficulty in this
problem. Each case proffers a new and singular factual pattern. The
analyses advanced herem, it is submitted, in combination with the
normal rules of construction applicable to insurance contracts, will be
of aid in determinng the probable outcome of a suit of this nature.
The two primary rules are, first, to construe ambigious provisions in
favor of the insured, and second, to interpret language of the policy
in light of the use and understanding of the ordinary man." ' A caveat
must be added in regard to the effect of sympathetic juries and the
understandable attitude of courts toward insurers who draw their
policies so strictly as to inspire the saying that if an insurance policy
were strictly interpreted, no one could ever recover. Actually, this
explains the attitude of the minority courts. They feel that there is an
unjustifiable attempt by the insurer, in the delimitation of his risk, to
make recovery the rare exception."' They feel that insurers should
O1 Even in the Evans case, the 3ury found that the heart trouble of the in-
sured was not a concurring cause.
" Bush v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Amer., 124 F. (2d) 528
(C. C. A. 2d 1942) The insured, apparently in robust good health stepped out
of a rowboat onto some rocks and jarred hnmself slightly. The jar loosened a
blood-clot which lodged in a muscle of the heart and caused his death. Directed
verdict for the defendant insurer. Affirming opinion by Justice Augustus Hand,
dissent by Justice C. E. Clark. For further cases see VAN Aux=.N, READY Rznm CE
DiGEsT op AccimNT IxsuRArcs LAw, op. cit. supra note 54.
08 Zinn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 6 Wn. (2d) 379, 107 P (2d) 921 (1940)
0 See Kane v. United Order of Comm. Travelers, 3 Wn. (2d) 355, 100 P (2d)
1036 (1940), cited note 58 supra. The restrictive provisions of the policy read,
" nor shall the order be liable (for losses) resulting from war or riot,
riding or driving a motor vehicle in a race, fighting, violation of any law, inten-
tionally self-inflicted injuries (fatal or otherwise), self-destruction (while sane
or insane), murder or disappearance, injuries intentionally inflicted by others,
resulting in death, or from voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, or for
over-exertion (unless in effort to save human life), or medical, mechanical or
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not be allowed to solicit policies and collect premiums and then, by
such technical means, escape liability for their advertised coverages.
Nor do the majority courts transcend this attitude completely; they
merely accord it lesser moment.
surgical treatment (except where the surgical treatment is made necssary by the
accident), nor for any accident (fatal or otherwise), to a member who is in any
degree under the influence or in consequence of having been under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, alcohol or narcotic.
"Nor for appendicitis, fits, epilepsy, mental infirmity, ivy poisoning,
ptomaine poisoning, or other poisoning, bite or sting of an insect or any infection
(unless the infection is introduced into, by or through an open wound which
open wound must be caused by external, violent and accidental means and be
visible to the unaided eye), inhaling of manufactured or natural gas, carbon
monoxide poisoning, hydrogen or any other form of gas causing asphyxiation
(voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious), venereal disease, cerebral
hemorrhage, spinal hemorrhage, heat prostration, sunstroke or sunburn."
